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Summary findings
The high commercial lending rates Nicaragua is currently  rates in other Central American countries. These high real
experiencing, together with a perceived scarcity of credit,  rates are attributable entirely to a real currency
have often been blamed for the country's  slow growth  depreciation that has been taking place since 1992, and
and have been considered a major failing of the  are not greatly different from rates observed in other Latin
adjustment program initiated in 1991.  American countries that underwent similar adjustments.
Lachler suggests that such blame is largely misplaced.  Lachler explains the link between real interest rates
Current interest rates are indeed higher than historical  and adjustment in Nicaragua and, in that context,
levels or international benchmark rates (such as LIBOR  explores policy options for reducing interest rates.
or the U.S. treasury bill rate), but those are not the  His main conclusion: A sustained reduction in real
appropriate comparators  for Nicaragua today.  interest rates to below those observed in neighboring
On the other hand, Nicaragua's real interest rates have  countries would require further  major structural changes,
risen significantly in recent years and currently exceed real  such as the adoption  of a foreign currency standard.
This paper - a product of the Country Operations Division, Country Department  11,  Latin America and the Caribbean
Region - is a self-standing report prepared  as a contribution to the Bank's ongoing policy dialogue with Nicaragua on
important economic issues facing the country. Copies of this paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street
NW, Washington, DC 20433.  Please contact Gerry Carter,  room 14-308, telephone 202-473-0603,  fax 202-676-1464,
Internet address gcarter@worldbank.org.  November  1995. (30 pages)
The Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  disseminates  the findings  of work in progress  to encourage  the excbange  of ideas  about
development issues.  An objective of the series  is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The
papers carry the names of the authors and should be used and cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions are the
authors' own and should not be attributed to the World Bank, its Executiv/e  Board of Directors, or any of its member countries.
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Sacasa  for their thoughtful  comments  on earlier drafts.I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ INTEREST RATES, CREDIT AND ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT
IN NICARAGUA
1.  The high commercial  lending rates currently observed  in Nicaragua, together with a
perceived  scarcity of credit, have  been frequently  blamed for the country's slow growth and
pointed  out as a major failing  of the adjustment  program  initiated  in 1991. This essay suggests
that such blame is largely misplaced.  While current interest rates are indeed high when
compared with historical  levels or international  benchmark  rates such as LIBOR or the US
Treasury  Bill rate, these  rates are not the appropriate  comparators  for Nicaragua  today. A look
at rates prevailing  elsewhere  in Latin America  reveals  that Nicaragua's  dollar-equivalent  interest
rates are not unusually high.  Nicaragua's  real interest rates, on the other hand, have risen
significantly  in  recent years and are currently above real rates in  other Central American
countries. These high real rates are entirely  explained  by a real currency  depreciation  that has
been taking  place since 1992  and are also not unusual  compared  to the rates observed  in other
Latin American  countries  that experienced  similar  adjustments. This essay seeks to explain  the
link between real interest rates and the adjustment  process in Nicaragua, and in that context
discuss alternative  policy options for reducing interest rates.  The main conclusion of this
analysis is  that a  sustained reduction in  real interest rates below the  rates observed in
neighboring  countries  would  require further major structural changes,  such as the adoption  of
a foreign  currency  standard.
I.  Background
2.  Interest rates have risen throughout  Latin America  since the onset of the debt crisis in
the early 1980s  and subsequent  liberalization  of financial  markets. Many factors  contributed  to
this phenomenon:  adverse  terms of trade shocks  and rising  intemational  interest  rates, combined
with overambitious  public spending  programs,  led to a rapid expansion  of fiscal deficits that
initially  were financed  with foreign  borrowings. As foreign  borrowing  opportunities  dried up,
rampant  inflation  and dollarization  ensued. Attempts  to stem this tide through  interest  rate and
capital controls discouraged  domestic financial savings and  encouraged capital flight.
Repressive financial policies, sometimes  accompanied  by the nationalization  of  banks, left
financial institutions severely weakened.  At the  same time, financial innovations  greatly
increased  the mobility  of capital  across  national  frontiers,  so that the controls  previously  applied
to maintain  interest rates artificially  low became  largely ineffective. As these events  unfolded,
interest  rates  increased  because (i) savers,  once hurt by inflation,  subsequently  demanded  higher
returns to compensate  for the risk of renewed  instability, (ii) interest controls could not be
maintained  lest they encourage  further  capital flight, and (iii) the cost of intermediating  credit
increased as financial  institutions  became weaker.  Nicaragua's  financial system  also evolved
according  to this stylized  pattern,  with additional  distortions  induced  by civil war  and centralized
planning. By the end of the 1980s,  it had experienced  one of the worst  hyperinflations  observed
in Latin America  and its nationalized  financial  system  was bankrupted.
3.  In March 1991, the Government  of Nicaragua  initiated a  stabilization  and market-
liberalizing  adjustment  program designed  to promote faster output and export growth.  This
program  has been very successful  in bringing  down  inflation  and arresting  the continuing  decline
of GDP that took place after 1983. A key element  of this program  is the liberalization  of the
financial  sector, which included (i) the unification  of the exchange  rate system  into an official
market for current account  transactions  and a parallel market for financial  and non-government
service account transactions, (ii) progressive  removal of interest rate controls, which were2
completely  eliminated  by 1993, and (iii) eliminating  the practice of directing  credit to specific
subsectors. The monopoly  on banking  services  held by the state-owned  banks was abolished  in
1991 and, by the end of 1994, nine private  commercial  banks had begun to operate.
4.  With the liberalization  of the financial  sector, active markets developed  for loans and
deposits  in both US Dollars and Cordobas.  All Cordoba transactions  except sight deposits,
however,  continue  to include a "maintenance  of value"  provision,  whereby  the rate of return in
local currency  is indexed  to the official  exchange  rate.  Even though the stabilization  program
succeeded  in bringing  down  inflation  rates  near single  digit  figures  and in maintaining  the spread
between the parallel and official  exchange  rates below 5 percent, the market has continued to
express  a general preference  for indexed  transactions.
II.  The Evolution of Interest  Rates since 1991
5.  A discussion of interest rates, especially  in a comparative  context, only makes sense
when their nominal levels are adjusted for differences  in inflation  or in the rate of currency
depreciation. Accordingly,  this analysis focuses on dollar-equivalent  and real interest rates,
using a decomposition  method  applied by Rodriguez  (1994): for any nominal  lending  rate, IA,
the corresponding ex post dollar-equivalent rate is given by IADOL  s  IA - DEV, where DEV
stands  for the rate of devaluation  of the domestic  currency.' The real interest rate, in turn, is
derived  as LIREAL  - IA - INF, where INF represents  the rate of domestic  inflation. In the
case of Nicaragua,  since virtually all loans and deposits  are indexed  to the US Dollar, interest
rates are automatically  quoted as ex post dollar-equivalent  rates based on the official  exchange
rate.  To calculate  real interest rates in that case first requires  that the dollar-equivalent  rate be
transformed  into nominal  Cordoba  rates (using  the official  devaluation  rate) and then deflated
by the domestic  inflation  rate.
Dollar-Equivalent Interest Rates
6.  The top half of  Taible 1  compares the average dollar-equivalent  lending rates in
Nicaragua  with those  prevailing  in the other Central  American  countries  during 1991-94. These
lending  rates  refer to short term loans with maturities  of up to one-year. As described  in Annex
B, these lending  rates do not always  refer to the same  loan modality  or aggregation  procedure.
For some countries they refer to weighted-average  rates and for others to arithmetic  averages.
In spite of these differences,  however,  meaningful  comparisons  across countries can still be
made.  Based on Table 1, Nicaragua's  dollar-equivalent  lending rates do not appear to be
systematically  higher than those observed in the other countries in  the region.  Although
somewhat  higher than the Central American  average  in 1991-93,  Nicaragua's  rates are clearly
below  the average  in the first half of 1994. In this sample, only Honduras  stands  out with very
negative interest rates  in  1993-94, suggesting the  onset  of  disorderly macroeconomic
1.  This derivation is an apprximation  of the corect  conversion formula, 1+IADOL  =  (1+IA)/(1+DEV).  Applying the
natural log operator to both sides of the equation, this expression converges to IADOL  =  IA-DEV, as IA and DEV approach
zero; since lim Ln(1 +x)  =  x as x- >0.  The same approximation method also applies to the calculation of real interest rates,
1+IAREAL  =  (1+IA)/(1+INF).  The  dollar-equivalent and  real  interest rates presented  here  are  aU based  on  these
approximations in order to permit comparisons with the results obtained for other countries by Rodriguez (1994), who used this
approximation method to decompose interest rates into naturally additive spreads.  To maintain appmximation errors within
acceptable bounds, al  interest rates are first transformed into monthly rates before applying the approximation procedure and
then reconverted into annual rates.3
adjustments. Excluding  Honduras  from the sample,  the average  lending  rate over the three year
period covered  in Thble 1 is 19.8 percent for the region and 20.5 percent for Nicaragua.
TABLE 1
Average  Lending Rates in Central America
(on Local Currency  Loans)
19911  1  1992  1  1993  19942
Dollar Equivalent Lending Rates (in percent per annum)
Costa Rica  25.3  30.2  19.9  26.1
El Salvador  15.1  8.7  19.8  18.6
Guatemala  18.5  15.2  14.7  30.9
Honduras  19.4  12.3  -1.0  -14.5
NICARAGUA  22.3  22.7  20.5  14.1
Real Lending  Rates  (in percent per annum)
Costa  Rica  14.2  17.3  19.3  15.1
El Salvador  16.8  -3.8  6.4  9.8
Guatemala  15.1  5.7  9.7  14.3
Honduras  14.0  13.9  4.4  -7.7
NICARAGUA  3.6  20.5  23.2  21.4
1 Rates  for 1991  refer to July through  December.
2 Rates  for 1994 refer to January  through  June.
Source:  See Annex  B.
7.  Using a  sample of  six South American countries and Mexico, 2 Rodriguez (1994)
calculated the average  dollar-equivalent  lending rate for local-currency  operations to be 35
percent in 1992 (or 32 percent when Peru is excluded  from the sample). These rates appear
significantly  higher than those  reported  on average  for Central America. The author also notes,
however,  that a dollarization  process has been taking  place in these countries  (similar to that
observed in Nicaragua), which has reduced significantly  the relevance  of unindexed  local-
currency  transactions. In the case of Argentina,  for example,  he calculated  that only 43 percent
of credit  transactions  in 1992  were made  in unindexed  local currency  (at an average  lending  rate
2.  The countries included in Rodriguez' (1994) sample are: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay.
In 1992, Peru experienced sharp exchange rate fluctuations that temporarily resulted in highly negative interest rates that distort
the sample average interest rates for that year.  lb account for this distortion, the average interest rates are presented both with
and without Peru.4
of 36 percent), while 57 percent of credits were indexed  or dollar-denominated  (at an average
rate of 13 percent), yielding  a weighted-average,  dollar-equivalent  lending rate of 23 percent.
When all sources of credit are included  in this manner,  Rodriguez  (1994,  pg. 22) estimates  that
the average  dollar-equivalent  lending rates in his country sample was close to 21 percent in
1992. This last figure  approximates  the average  rates calculated  for Central America. 3
TABLE  2
Average  Dollar-Equivalent  Borrowing Rates in Central America
(on Local Currency  Deposits)
l  19911  1992  1993  19942
(in percent  per annum)
Costa Rica:  1 month  dep.  9.4  17.1  7.2  12.8
3 month  cert.  14.5  18.8  10.0  14.6
El Salvador:  2 month dep.  9.6  4.0  15.0  12.9
Guatemala:  1 month dep.  10.5  6.4  3.4  17.2
Honduras:  1 month dep.  6.8  1.0  -11.6  -24.6
3 month  cert.  8.9  6.8  -8.0  -20.5
Nicaragua:  1 month dep.  16.1  14.9  12.2  5.9
XRates  for 1991  refer to July through  December.
2 Rates for 1994  refer to January  through  June.
Source:  See Annex  B.
8.  A similar observation  also applies  to dollar-equivalent  borrowing  rates, which  are shown
in  Tible  2.  The average dollar-equivalent  interest rate on  1-month savings deposits in
Nicaragua  is 12.7  percent, which  is within  the range  of rates  observed  in other Central  American
countries;  again excepting  Honduras. Nicaragua's  borrowing  rates are highest  in 1991 and then
decline  over time.  As described  in the next section,  this interest  rate behavior  can be attributed
to declining  risk premia.  The average  rate calculated  by Rodriguez  for South America and
Mexico  in 1992 is 11.3 percent (excluding  Peru). These rates are close enough  to reaffirm  the
earlier finding  that interest rates in Nicaragua  are not unusually  high by regional  standards.
9.  The preceding  finding  -- that dollar-equivalent  interest  rates appear  to be roughly  similar
across the region -- should not come as a surprise in view of the liberalized  conditions that
currently characterize  most financial  markets  in Latin America.  As predicted  by the interest
parity hypothesis,  under conditions  of sufficient  capital  mobility,  interest rate arbitrage  equates
3.  Data on the extent of dollarization in the Central American countries is very limited.  In Nicaragua, about 50 percent of an
commercial bank deposits are denominated in US Dollars, but only 19 percent of loans are dollar-denominatd.  Lending rates
in late 1994 on these dollar-loans are quoted at 14-16 percent.  Based on this information, the weighted average dollar-equivalent
lending rate in Nicaragua for 1994 (Jan-Sep) is about 18.9 percent.5
domestic interest rates to the corresponding  "world" interest rates plus the expected rate of
devaluation  and a  premium to compensate for differences in  country and currency risk.
Therefore,  since capital  controls  have  been largely eliminated  and assuming  that exchange  rate
expectations  are not systematically  biased, Nicaragua's  dollar-equivalent  interest  rates  should  on
average  turn out similar to the rates prevailing  in neighboring  countries,  except for differences
in risk.  In view of Nicaragua's  reputation  as an extremely  high-risk country (Euromoney,
September  1994),  perhaps  the most surprising  finding  so far is that Nicaragua's  dollar-equivalent
rates do not appear to be significantly  higher than those observed  elsewhere  in the region.
Basic Decomposition  of Risk
10.  This  subsection identifies  two elements of risk embodied in  the interest rate.  As
described by  Rodriguez (1994) and  shown in  TFble 3,  lending rates can  be  additively
decomposed  into the following  components:
Dollar-Equiv.
Lending  Rate  =  Lending  Spread  +  Borrowing  Rate
=  I-ending Spread  +  Borrowing Spread  + TBILL,
where TBILL denotes the interest rate on (3-month)  US Treasury Bills, which serves as a
benchmark  to calculate risk premia. The coexistence  in Nicaragua  of dollar-denominated  and
Cordoba-denominated  deposits  permits  a further  decomposition  of the Borrowing  Spread  into two
sources  of risk as:
Dollar-Equiv.
Lending  Rate  =  Lending  Spread  +  CRED  + RISK  +  TBILL,
where  RISK  represents  a measure  of country  risk and CRED represents  a measure  of credibility
in the economic  program, sometimes  referred  to as currency  risk.  (Increases  in CRED indicate
declining  credibility.)
11.  The variable  denoted  RISK is defined  as the difference  between  the average  interest  rate
on Dollar-denominated  deposits in Nicaragua  and the US Treasury Bill rate.  Since Dollar
deposits  in Nicaragua  and US Treasury  Bills are both denominated  in the same currency,  they
should command the same rate of return except for differences  in risk associated  with the
country/institution  that emits each financial  instrument. Based on similar reasoning,  CRED  is
defined as the difference  between the dollar-equivalent  interest rate on Cordoba-denominated
deposits  and the interest rate on Dollar-denominated  deposits  in Nicaragua.  Since Cordoba-
denominated  term deposits  in Nicaragua  are indexed  to the US Dollar, their interest rate should
be the same as the rate on a Dollar-denominated  deposit if it were certain that the Cordoba
would  be maintained  fully convertible  vis-a-vis  the US Dollar. Full convertibility  in this context
would  mean the maintenance  of a unified  exchange  rate (or constant  exchange  rate spread)  and
the absence of  exchange controls.  The difference between both interest rates, therefore,
measures  the market's  lack of confidence  in policymakers'  ability to maintain  unified  exchange
rates, which ultimately depends on  the ability to  maintain adequate fiscal and  monetary
discipline. Both sources  of risk have  been calculated  for Nicaragua  with the results shown  in
lable  3.6
TABLE 3
Main Determinants of the Interest Rate in Nicaragua
Dollar-Equiv.  Lending  Borrowing
Lending Rate  Spread  Spread  TBILL
l  ~~~~CRED_t  RISK
NICARAGUA  annual average rates (in %)
1991 (Jul-Dec)  22.3  6.2  10.7  0.4  5.0
1992  22.7  7.8  10.0  1.5  3.4
1993  20.5  8.3  7.0  2.2  3.0
1994 (Jan-Sep)  19.8  8.7  5.5  1.9  3.7
Source:  entral Bank  of Nicaragua
12.  According to the preceding decomposition method, the lending rate is determined by
(i) the rate on US Treasury Bills (as a proxy for international credit conditions), (ii) the market's
perception of country risk, (iii) the market's confidence  in the macroeconomic program, and (iv)
the average lending spread of commercial banks.  Thble 3 shows that among these four factors,
country risk  (RISK)  appears to be the least significant in  determining borrowing spreads in
Nicaragua.  Much more important is the perceived risk of destabilization, (CRED).  In any case,
both CRED and RISK appear to be declining in 1994, suggesting a gradual return of confidence
in the Nicaraguan economy.  The other important component in determining the lending rate is
the lending spread.  Although the spreads shown in Table 3 are not unusually high by Central
and South American standards, they are high compared to those observed in other regions with
competitive banking systems.
Real Interest Rates
13.  The lower half of Table 1 describes the real lending rates observed in Central America
during  1991-94.  The average real rate for the Central American region over the three-year
period turns out to be  11.7 percent (or 12.8 percent when Honduras is excluded).  In contrast
to the earlier finding on dollar-equivalent rates, Nicaragua stands out this time by exhibiting the
highest real lending rates in Central America during 1992-94; with average rates exceeding 20
percent.  By way of comparison, Rodriguez (1994) calculated the average real lending rate to
be  30 percent  for credit  transations in  local  currency during  1992 for his  sample of Latin
American countries (or 22 percent if Peru is excluded from the sample).  When indexed and
dollar-denominated credit sources are also included, however, he estimates the weighted-average
real lending rate to be around 20 percent (or 12 percent when Peru is excluded).7
III.  Real Interest and Exchange Rates
14.  The contrasting behavior of real and dollar-equivalent interest rates is entirely due  to
changes in the real exchange rate.  Recall that the dollar-equivalent lending rate, LADOL, and
the real lending rate, IAREAL, are defined as:
IADOL  =  IA - DEV,  and  IAREAL  =  IA - INF.
The difference between both rates can then be seen to represent an index of real exchange rate
changes, denoted DRER:
DRER  =  IAREAL  - IADOL  =  DEV  - INF,
such that DRER >  0 indicates a real devaluation of the local currency and DRER  <  0 indicates
a  real  appreciation. 4 Observe from  Table  4  that real  lending rates in  Nicaragua quickly
increase after  1991 and  then exceed dollar-equivalent rates after  1992, indicating that a  real
devaluation has been taking place.  This real devaluation coincides with the stabilization and
adjustment program initiated in 1991 with the objective of promoting efficient export-led growth
and reducing the country's external imbalances.  Among the other Central American countries,
only Honduras experienced a similar real exchange rate depreciation in  1993-94.
15.  The need for structural adjustment arises when balance of payments deficits have become
unsustainable and a country's growth is constrained by a lack of foreign reserves.  This has been
the case with Nicaragua,  whose resource balance deficit in  1991-92 averaged 30 percent of
GDP, while its exports had declined to less than half the value exported a decade earlier.  While
foreign donors have been willing to finance such high external deficits on a  temporary basis,
they have also indicated that Nicaragua cannot count on such aid inflows indefinitely.  Due to
budget constraints within the donor countries and the emergence of new claimants on donor
funds (especially in the former Soviet Union and  Middle East),  aid flows to  Nicaragua are
expected to decline gradually toward the per-capita aid levels received by other low-income
countries in the region. 5 Under these circumstances, a real devaluation would be desirable in
4.  The most common definition of the real exchange rate for analytical purposes is the price of tradables divided by the price
of non-tradables.  Since such price  series are difficult to obtain,  a common procedure is to construct a proxy for the real
exchange rate as,  RER  =  EPfIP, where E is the nominal exchange rate (Cordobas per US$), P  is the US Wholesale Price
Index, and P is the domestic Consumer Price Index.  Since consumer price indexes include the prices of non4radables, while
wholesale price indexes only contain the prices  of traded goods, this proxy variable tracks changes in the relative price of
tradeables to non-tradeables.  Thking  a proportional derivative of RER, denoted DRER, yields:  DRER = DEV - INF  + INF,
where DEV = DE/E,  INF =  DP/P and INF' =  DPY/P'. This formulation is the same as that in the text under the assumption
that changes in the US Wholesale Price  Index can be ignored, since they are negligible compared to changes in the nominal
exchange rates and the domestic  CPI.  An important byproduct of  ignoring INF,  however, is that  this  formula yields a
downwardly biased measure of real devaluation rates.  The estimates of real devaluation rates in lkble  4, therefore, are useful
for comparing real devaluation rates aeross countries in the region, but are less accurate for measuring the absolute amount of
real devaluation taking place in any one country.
S.  While total aid inflaws to Nicaragua (including donations and loans) have been declining gradually, the composition of that
aid has changed substantially in favor of project (tied) aid.  In particular, the liquid (untied) portion of aid declined by more than
half,  from USS 477 million in 1992 to US$ 217 million in 1994.  This aid component is the most relevant for the issues of
economic adjustment addressed  here,  given that  reductions in project aid  are automatically associated with an  equivalent
reduction of imports (and, thus,  do not immediately create an unfinanced external deficit), whereas reductions in liquid aid
require  deliberate  policy responses to discourage imports  and promote exports,  or  adjustments through reduced  domestic
absorption.8
order to encourage the compensatory adjustments needed to close the balance of payments gap
created by the aid decline.
TABLE 4
Real Devaluation Rates in Central America (DRER =  LAREAL  - LADOL)
(in percent per annum)
19911  1992  1993  19942
Costa Rica  -11.1  -12.9  -0.6  -11.0
El Salvador  1.7  -12.5  -13.4  -8.8
Guatemala  -3.4  -9.5  -5.0  -16.6
Honduras  -5.4  1.6  5.4  6.8
NICARAGUA  -18.7  -2.2  2.7  7.3
Rates for 1991 refer to July through December
2  Rates for 1994 refer to January through June
Source:  Own calculations based on data in Table 1.
Note that negative figures indicate a real appreciation of the local currency.
16.  It is also important, however, to recognize that Nicaragua does not  have much choice
about reducing its external deficit in the face of declining foreign aid because it does not have
unlimited reserves to draw down and lacks the necessary financial creditworthiness to borrow
abroad  from  non-concessional  sources.  That  is,  Nicaragua  cannot  borrow  at  will  from
international financial markets to close a balance of payments gap.  Rather, this gap is mainly
determined by the amount of net aid supplied by foreign donors, be  it in the form of  fresh
disbursements or debt service relief.  As the supply of aid is reduced, therefore, Nicaragua has
to  decrease  its  trade deficit, either  in  an  orderly  manner through a  deliberate reduction  of
domestic absorption, coupled with supply-side incentives, or in a disorderly manner through an
inflation tax and protectionist trade policies.  Either way, the trade deficit has to come down and
this invariably implies a real exchange rate devaluation; i.e., an increase in the relative price of
tradeable goods versus the price of non-tradeables. 6
17.  Real devaluations  play an important role in reestablishing  external balance by encouraging
the production of exportable goods and  import substitutes, while discouraging the domestic
consumption of both products.  This shift in economic incentives is reinforced by the rise in real
interest  rates  above dollar-equivalent rates:  for  producers  of  tradeable  goods,  the  dollar-
equivalent lending rate is of greater relevance when making investment decisions than real rates
because their receivables are calculated in dollar-denominated terms with prices determined in
6.  Since the prices of tradeable goods in a smaU open economy are determined in the wvrld market, domestic supply and
demand conditions only serve to determine the prices of non-tradeables.  Tb reduce the trade deficit by a target amount in this
context, aggregate domestic absorption has to decline, which exerts downward pressure on the prices of non-tradeables and,
thereby, raises the relative price of tradeables.  This argument is spelled out with greater analytical rigor in Annex A.9
world markets. Conversely,  the real interest  rate is more relevant  for producers of non-tradeable
goods, the prices of which figure more prominently  in the calculation  of domestic inflation.
Therefore,  an increase in real lending  rates above  dollar-equivalent  rates -- reflecting  the onset
of a real devaluation  -- renders investments  in the tradeables  sector relatively more attractive
than investments  in the non-tradeables  sector.  This is precisely the desired incentive  pattern
when seeking  to promote  an outward-oriented  economic  adjustment.
18.  Any systematic  divergence  between  real and dollar-equivalent  interest rates can only be
temporary,  however,  since that divergence  is due to the rate of change, rather than IW1, of the
real exchange  rate.  Once the real exchange  rate reaches its equilibrium  level, the pressure to
depreciate  or appreciate  further is removed  and, hence, both interest rates wwuld  again be
identical.
19.  One final observation  is that Nicaragua's  experience  with high real interest rates is not
unique  and not nearly  as disruptive  as in some  other countries  facing  adjustment  needs. In fact,
the rates observed  in Nicaragua  appear modest  compared  to the truly exorbitant  real rates (in
excess  of 70 percent)  reached  in Argentina  or Peru at the onset of their adjustment  programs  in
the early 1990s;  see Annex  D.
IV.  Why Do High Real Interest  Rates Constitute  a Problem?
20.  The surge in real interest rates observed worldwide in the early  1980s has raised
widespread  concern about their possibly detrimental  economic  effects.  In response to these
concerns,  numerous  studies  were carried out to measure  the impact  of high interest  rates on key
economic  variables such as output growth, investment,  factor productivity  and relative factor
returns.  An empirical  regularity  observed  in several cross-country  studies (e.g., World Bank
(1989)  and Galbis (1993))  is that countries with higher real interest rates generally  tended  to
exhibit faster output growth,  but not higher investment  rates. This finding  suggests  that higher
interest  rates discourage  investment,  but encourage  a more  efficient  allocation  of resources  which
raises overall  productivity,  such that the net impact  on growth  is positive. While other studies
(e.g., Khatkhate,  1988)  have  questioned  the empirical  robustness  of these  findings,  a basic  lesson
from this literature  still holds, namely that higher interest rates do not automatically  constitute
an obstacle to growth.  Rather, the impact of higher interest rates on investment  and growth
mainly  depends  on what has caused  interest  rates to rise in the first place. 7
21.  Earlier sections  indicated  that the increase  of real interest rates observed  in Nicaragua
is primarily caused  by two factors:  one is the elimination  of domestic  interest rate and capital
controls, which  permitted Nicaragua's financial market to  become reconnected to  the
international  financial  system. This, in turn, enabled  Nicaragua's  dollar-equivalent  interest  rates
to reach international  levels,  plus a risk margin. The second important  factor is the onset of a
real devaluation,  which coincided  with the adoption  of stabilization  and adjustment  measures
needed to reduce Nicaragua's unsustainable  external deficit.  Since the presence of interest
7.  On theoretical  grounds one would not expect a simple, invariant relationship between real interest rates, investment, sAvi
and growth,  since all these  variables are  simultaneously determined by other  more  fundamental factors.  For example,  an
increase in real interest rates  due to a decline in financial savings on account of an  expected dealuation  is likely  to be neptively
related to investment and growth.  In contrast, an increase in real  rates occasioned by an investment surge  triggered  by the
discovery of precious natural resources would be associated with higher investment and growth.10
controls  generally  tends to contract the size of credit markets,  their elimination  should lead to
an overall expansion of credit. 8 On the other hand, the introduction  of  stabilization  and
adjustment  measures  designed  to reduce the extemal deficit would be expected to restrain the
expansion  of credit triggered  by the elimination  of controls.  Judging by the extremely  rapid
growth of private sector credit during 1991-94, this restraining force appears to have been
minimal; see Figure 1.  While real GDP has only grown by about 3 percent during 1991
through 1994, the volume  of outstanding  credit has grown in real terms by 93 percent between
September  1991  and September  1994. This rapid expansion  in credit took place, moreover,  in
spite  of a major portfolio  clean-up  in the public commercial  banks that reduced  the volume  of
outstanding  credit by 32 percent between March 1992 and June 1992.  Clearly, the total
availability  of credit does not appear to have  been a major constraint  on growth.
22.  The notion that higher  real interest  rates lead to higher productivity  is only expected  to
apply for economies  where the system  of credit allocation functions  efficiently  in channeling
savings to  those activities with  the
highest expected  rates of return.  The
combination of  rapid credit growth,
rising  real  interest rates  and  slow  Evolution of Commercial  Bank
output growth observed in Nicaragua  Credl
during 1992-94,  however,  casts doubt
on the efficiency  of its credit  allocation  L  3000.00
mechanisms. It suggests,  instead, that  Q  2W0.0I)
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sectoral conditions will soon take place
to  render  the  enterprise profitable
again.  In the absence of adequate  prudential  supervision,  this leads to roll-over  bank lending
to troubled  enterprises  that exacerbates  their financial  difficulties,  but contributes  little to output
growth.
23.  Nicaragua's  public  banks  are especially  vulnerable  in this regard. The two largest  public
banks,  BANADES  and BANIC,  account  for about  two-thirds  of total commercial  loans  and, over
the last decade, have developed  unsound lending  practices,  while becoming  accustomed  to lax
banking supervision.  Given that the past debts owed to the public banks were routinely
forgiven, either through  government  decree or through  rapid inflation, a culture of mistaking
8.  Interest rate controls introduce a wedge between the demand and supply for credit.  The rise in interest rates triggered by
the elimination  of controls  reduces  the overall  excess demand  for credit, but raises  the supply  of credit, which is the binding
side of the market under the imposition  of interest rate ceilings. The expansion  of credit supply,  therefore,  would  be the
dominant  fictor determining  the evolution  of total  credit. In the event  that the supply  of credit  is completely  interst-inelastic
(as is sometimes  claimed),  the increase  in interest  rates following  the removal  of controls  ould  still  have  a positive  effect  on
growth  by promoting  a reallocation  of credit  toward  the most productive  activities. Note, by may  of contrast,  that  a system  with
binding  interest  ceilings  promotes  the rationing  of credit  to the safest  activities  satisfying  a minimum  rate of return.11
credit for income transfers developed  among many borrowers in  Nicaragua.  Government
declarations  that such  practices  would  not be repeated  have  had little apparent  impact, moreover,
given the rapid pace of expansion  of the public banks' loan portfolios  in spite of soaring real
interest rates.  It is not surprising,  then, that the two largest public banks continued  to have
major loan recovery  problems. They were bankrupt in 1991 and again reached a position of
negative  net worth in 1994,  just two years  after they had been fully  recapitalized.
24.  This experience  suggests  that high interest rates are not the main obstacle  to growth  in
Nicaragua. Rather,  the more important  problem is the inefficiency  of financial  intermediation,
which  is mainly  attributable  to the mismanaged  public  banking system. All that the rise of real
interest  rates has done is to unveil  more quickly  the underlying  wealnesses  of the public banks.
V.  Alternative  Policy  Options  for  Reducing  Interest  Rates
25.  From the viewpoint  of individual  investors,  there  is no question  that an environment  with
low  real interest  rates is always  preferrable  to one with high rates; all other things  equal. Where
questions  arise is the extent  to which Nicaragua's  policymakers  can influence  real interest rates
without generating  other harmful side-effects. The remainder of this essay discusses several
options and proposals  for reducing  interest rates, with special  attention  to such side-effects.
Reverse  the Process of Financial Liberalization?
Since the elimination of  interest rate controls  permitted the  rise in dollar-
equivalent interest rates toward the  rates observed internationally,  it  would
appear that Nicaragua's  rates could be reduced  again simply by reintroducing
controls  and, thereby,  severing  the link with internationalfinancial  markets.
26.  This proposal would  have  many negative  consequences:  First, a state-ordered  reduction
of  interest rates would lead  to  a  rapid outflow of  domestic deposits, attracted by  the
comparatively  higher rates of return offered  in other financial  markets. 'Ib prevent  this outflow,
capital  controls  would  have  to be reimposed. While capital  controls  may  have  been temporarily
effective  some decades ago, many  financial  innovations  since then have rendered  such controls
ineffective. The outflow  of deposits  would  trigger  a contraction  of the money  supply  and, thus,
ultimately  reduce the supply  of credit.  Second,  the imposition  of interest rate ceilings  would
require the rationing  of credit.  Such a system  would  only achieve  lower interest rates for the
few lucky beneficiaries  that happen  to receive  credit.  The other investors  that are rationed  out
of the market, would  face higher interest rates than before the imposition  of controls.  Third,
systems  of credit rationing  with interest rate ceilings  do not encourage  the allocation  of credit
to the most productive  activities;  see footnote  8.  The adoption  of this system,  therefore,  would
reduce the rate of productivity  growth  and, thereby,  the overall  growth  rate.
27.  A common  variant of this proposal  is to consider schemes  for directing  credit to specific
sectors that purportedly  exhibit  special  growth  potential. Arguments  in favor  of such  a strategy
assume  that public sector bureaucrats  are in a better  position  to identify  potential  growth  sectors
than bankers  whose  well-being  depends  directly  on the successful  identification  of those sectors.
The key question to be asked in this context is why private banks are not investing  in these
sectors. If institutional  constraints  or market  impediments  are shown  to be important  barriers,
then logic dictates  that attention  should  focus on the direct elimination  of those barriers, rather12
than on establishing  compensatory  distortions. Furthermore,  this proposal  ignores that money
is fungible. That is, there is little guarantee  that funds disbursed  for particular activities  will in
fact be used for those  activities  in the absence  of costly monitoring  systems. The establishment
of costly monitoring  systems,  on the other hand, would defeat the original purpose that had
motivated  this proposal, which is to reduce financial  intermediation  costs.
Reverse  the Stabilization Process?
In  liberalized  financial markets, dollar-equivalent  interest rates are mainly
determined by  international  credit conditions.  As  shown earlier, however,
Nicaragua's  real interest rates were driven above dollar-equivalent  rates by a
process of real devaluation. It would appear, therefore,  that real interest rates
could  be reduced  by generating  a real exchange  rate appreciation;  most easily by
expanding  aggregate  demand.
28.  This proposal  suffers  from several  shortcomings  that render it unsustainable:  to maintain
real interest rates below the international  dollar-equivalent  rate would  require a continuing  real
appreciation  of the currency.  A continuing  real appreciation  would result in a deteriorating
current account deficit of the balance of payments,  which is unsustainable,  unless Nicaragua
could count on ever increasing  aid inflows. However,  all indications  currently point toward
further reductions  of external  aid flows, which will require further real depreciations. Under
these  circumstances,  attempts  to raise aggregate  demand  through  expansionary  fiscal  or monetary
policies would merely fuel runaway  inflation, without any lasting impact on relative prices,
including  the real exchange  rate.  As past experiences  in Nicaragua  and elsewhere  have  shown,
high inflation  interferes  with market  signals  (thereby  promoting  resource  misallocation  and lower
growth)  and imposes  a high tax on society's  poorest  members,  who are the least able to protect
their assets from the ravages  of inflation.
29.  It would  appear that the adverse  balance  of payments  impact  of a currency  appreciation
could be avoided  by raising  import barriers.  This option also leads to a dead-end, however,
since a continual  real exchange  rate appreciation  would  require an equally continual  raising  of
tariff and non-tariff  barriers.  Such a strategy would  progressively  close off the economy  and
eventually  choke off all trade with the rest of the world.  It is difficult  to imagine  how such a
strategy  could be conducive  to faster  growth  and rising  living standards.
Maintain current policy  settings.
The preceding reform-backtracking  proposals all entail unacceptable  economic
and social drawbacks. Nicaragua  is better off by  just consolidating  the market-
oriented reforms  that have already been implemented  and waiting  for them to
exert their  full effect.  The real exchange  rate will eventually  stop depreciating
when it reaches its equilibrium  level.  At that point,  real interest rates will
converge  to the lower  dollar-equivalent  rates.
30.  This is  an  economically  viable strategy.  Its  main drawback is  that it  may take
considerable  time for real interest  rates to fall, in part because  of the time lags involved  between13
the implementation  of adjustment  measures  and their impact. 9 A further complicating  factor is
Nicaragua's  extremely  high dependence  on foreign  aid.  Its anticipated  decline  will require  major
adjustments in  the  trade  balance deficit that,  in  turn,  require major real  exchange rate
adjustments  that would maintain  real interest rates above dollar-equivalent  rates.
31.  To estimate  the potential  real exchange  rate adjustment  needed  to reestablish  a sustainable
external  balance, consider that Nicaragua's  resource  balance  deficit  in 1992  was about 30 percent
of GDP. Total  foreign  donations  and net concessional  disbursements  in 1992 amounted to US$
650 million, or roughly US$ 160 per capita.  This figure is about six times higher than the
average  per-capita aid inflow received by other low income countries (excluding  China and
India); World Development  Report 1994.  Assuming  that the resource balance deficit declines
in direct proportion to any aid decline, then the six-fold  reduction in aid that would bring aid
to Nicaragua in line with the international  per-capita average  for low income countries would
require the trade balance deficit to fall to 5 percent of GDP. Using a simple simulation  model
of the Nicaraguan  economy,  Edwards (1992) estimated  that a reduction in the trade balance to
5 percent of  GDP over five years would require a  real devaluation  of between 35 and 55
percent. (Similar  estimates  of the required  real devaluation  were also obtained  in an independent
simulation  exercise  using the World  Bank's Revised  Minimum  Standard  Model; see World  Bank,
1993.)  By 1994, Nicaragua's  resource balance deficit had already declined to 20 percent of
GDP, in part helped by an improvement  in the terms of trade on account  of rising coffee  prices.
This reduction  of the external  deficit is about 40 percent of the total deficit reduction needed to
reach the target rate of 5 percent of GDP.  Therefore, based on the parameter settings of
Edwards' (1992) model, the real exchange  rate would  have to increase by an additional  amount
of between 21 to 33 percent.  If this adjustment  is spread out over five years, it would imply
an annual real devaluation  between  4.2 and 6.6 percent.  These rates represent the difference
by which real interest rates would  exceed on average  the dollar-equivalent  interest rates under
these  preceding  assumptions. That is, if dollar-equivalent  interest rates were to remain at around
20 percent per annum over the next five years, real rates would  be expected to average  around
25 percent over that period.  If aid inflows  decline more gradually  (rapidly) than assumed  here,
the adjustment  process would  be spread out over a longer (shorter) time period, resulting  in a
lower (higher)  real interest rate.
Deepen Flnancial  Sector  Reforms.
The interest rate decomposition shown in  Table 3  indicates that the  most
important determinants of  the dollar-equivalent  interest rate are the lending
spreads charged by the commercial  banks and the market's confidence in the
domestic currency, as  measured by  CRED.  Since the  adjustment process
described previously takes so  long, can  anything be  done to  reduce these
detenninants and, thereby, hasten the decline of interest rates without adverse
side-effects  ?
32.  Of the various factors that determine lending spreads, the high administrative  costs of
Nicaragua's commercial  banks deserve particular attention.  In  1992-94, administrative  costs
9.  In Chile, as one of the earliest and most successful reformers, it took about two years for real interest rates to return to prior
levels after the introduction of adjustment measures in the early 1980s; see  Galbis (1993).  Rodriguez (1994) also notes that,
for those countries in his sample experiencing adjustment programs, it took more than twm years for real interest rates to stop
adjusting after their initial rise in response to the adjustment measures.14
averaged  about 6 percent of total commercial  bank assets in Nicaragua  (Annex C).  This is high
by international  standards for developing  countries, where a ratio of 2-3 percent is considered
acceptable  for countries with low inflation.  A reduction of administrative  costs from 6 to 3
percent of  total assets, therefore, could yield a  reduction in lending spreads by at least 3
percentage  points, assuming that such cost savings  are passed on to bank customers. Vigorous
competition  in the banking system offers the best prospect, both, for promoting administrative
cost reductions  and ensuring  that those reductions  are translated  into lower lending spreads.
Privatizin2 the public banks
33.  The current structure of Nicaragua's  banking system  is not conducive  to such efficiency
improvements,  however. Studies  on optimal scale in banking indicate that scale economies  are
exhausted  when a bank's total assets reach a range of US$100-200  million (see, e.g., Guasch
1994).  As of December 1994, the total assets of Nicaragua's commercial banking system
amounted to  US$  890  million, which would sustain between 4  and  8  optimally scaled
commercial banks.  Under the current banking structure, however, the three public banks
account for almost 60 percent of total banking system  assets, while the remaining  40 percent is
divided up among 9 privately owned banks, the largest of which has assets of about US$ 70
million,  which is well below  the optimal  scale. While the merger  of several  private banks could
lead to the creation of two or three optimally scaled  banks, this number is too small to ensure
proper competition. That is, on the reasonable  assumption  that the public banks will continue
to operate inefficiently,  it would be easy for these few private banks to collude and retain any
cost savings as profits rather than passing them on to their customers in  the form of lower
interest rate spreads. The private  banks have  been expanding  rapidly and over time are expected
to overtake  the public banking  system  in asset size. This process  could be accelerated,  however,
by privatizing  the public banks. That would  hasten the creation of more efficiently  scaled  banks
that are likely to behave competitively,  which is needed to ensure that the economies of scale
are passed on to customers  in the form of reduced lending rates. 10 There are, moreover,  no
major economic  drawbacks  from adopting  this option.  Instead, further gains could be had by
eliminating  the fiscal burden currently generated  by the loss-making  public banks.
Promoting greater monetary integration
34.  Another way of reducing real interest rates would be to adopt the US Dollar as the
national currency.  According to  Thble 3,  such a  step would immediately reduce dollar-
equivalent  interest rates by the amount of the variable, CRED; i.e., by 5 to 6 percentage  points.
Domestic  borrowers,  in principle,  already have  this option, given the advanced  level of currency
substitution  that has taken place in Nicaragua. About one-half of all commercial  bank deposits
are currently dollar-denominated. On the other hand, only about 19 percent of all domestic
loans are dollar-denominated,  even though  the interest rate charged on such loans is much lower
than on Cordoba-denominated  loans; see footnote 3.  Rates on dollar-denominated  loans are 4
to 6 percentage  points below the average  dollar-equivalent  rate quoted for Cordoba-denominated
loans. Since Cordoba-denominated  loans  are fully indexed  to the US Dollar, the only factor that
1  0.  The creation of more private banks provides no guarantee that they will behave competitively, but it does render collusive
behavior more difficult and by that token contributes to promoting greater competition in the sector.15
can explain  this interest rate  difference  is the perceived  commitment  by the Nicaraguan  monetary
authorities  to maintain  the Cordoba  pegged  and convertible  vis-a-vis the US Dollar.
35.  The adoption  of an official  dollarization  policy,  along the lines of the Panamanian  system,
for example, would represent the strongest commitment  to a fixed parity on the part of the
Nicaraguan authorities.  Other institutional arrangements that  reflect a  relatively weaker
commitment  range from establishing  a Currency Board (as in Singapore  and proposed in El
Salvador),  to fixing the exchange  rate through  the Central Bank (as in Argentina),  to the existing
system  of indexation  in Nicaragua. The main drawbacks  of tying the domestic currency  to the
US Dollar are reduced seigniorage  and a curtailed  flexibility  to conduct  an independent  monetary
policy and to serve  as lender of last resort.  The decision  to index the Cordoba  to the US Dollar
already indicates that the Nicaraguan  authorities  have relinquished,  in principle, any ambitions
to conduct an independent  monetary policy. In wishing to retain enough flexibility  to function
as lender of last resort in the event of a financial  crisis, however,  the monetary  authorities  would
be qualifying their commitment to  a  fixed parity, since exercising the lender-of-last-resort
function (by issuing fiat money, rather than transferring  real resources from the fiscal budget)
would effectively mean giving up  the  exchange rate  peg.  Similarly, while  an  official
dollarization strategy would eliminate revenues from seigniorage", a Currency Board system
would permit some seigniorage  revenues  through the interest received on the foreign reserves
that back up the local currency. The seigniorage  obtained  under the Currency  Board, however,
will generally  be less than the amount  obtainable  under an adjustable  peg system,  given that the
reserve center's inflation rate is likely to be less than Nicaragua's  revenue-maximizing  inflation
rate.  In general, then, there is a trade-off  between greater seigniorage  or monetary autonomy
and a greater commitment  to a fixed exchange  rate, reflected  in the regime adopted to maintain
that rate.  This trade-off  translates  into a choice between  greater monetary  flexibility  and lower
interest  rates.1 2
VI.  Concluding Summary
36.  The preceding discussion pointed out that renewed destabilization  or backtracking  on
previous market liberalizing  reforms  do not offer a promising  path toward lower interest rates.
A preferable  alternative  is to simply  focus  on maintaining  macroeconomic  stability  and wait  until
past structural  reforms  exert their full effect  on interest rates. Under this option, Nicaragua  can
11.  These  seigniorage revenues are  not  entirely eliminated,  but  rather would be  captured  by the producer  of  the reserve
currency.  Seigniorage revenues are defined as S  = [M(t+ 1)- M(t)]/P(t)  =  DM(t)/P(t),  where M(t) is the monetary base at the
end of period t.  This expression can be rewritten and expressed as a share of real GDP as SIY =  {DM(t)/M(t)l[M(t)(P(t)*Y(t)J,
where Y denotes the level of GDP.  A rough estimate of the magnitudes involved can be obtained by calculating the seigniorage
revenues generated under the "steady-state" assumption that the inflation rate is equal to the rate of growth of the monetary base
minus the  rate of real  output growth; i.e.,  [DM(t)/M(t)]  =  [DP(t)/P(t)]  +  [DY(t)IY(t)].  The monetary base was equal to 8
percent of GDP in December 1994, while the rate of output growth and inflation in 1994 were 3 percent  and 12.4  percent,
respectively.  Using these parameter values yields an estimate of annual seigniomge revenues equivalent to 1.2 percent of GDP.
While these  revenues are not negligible, their order of magnitude in not such that their  elimination would necessarily lead to
a fiscal crisis for lack of alternative taxation sources.
12.  A further considertion  for the medium term is that the adoption of an official dollarization policy or a Currency Board
mechanism would render Nicaragua more attractive as an operting  environment for foreign banks.  To the extent that foreign
banks are attracted to operate in Nicaragua, interest rates would fall as increased competition in the banking sector drives down
lending spreads.  This consideration  becomes  especially relevant to the  extent that  there exist  Constitutional or  other  legal
impediments to the privatization of the public banks.16
expect to have the same dollar-equivalent  and real interest rates observed on average  in other
Latin American countries.  An even better outcome is available,  however, through additional
structural  reforms; namely by privatizing  the public banks and adopting  a monetary  regime that
expresses a  stronger pre-commitment  to  a fixed exchange rate.  The increased competition
generated  by privatizing  the public  banks could reduce  average  commercial  bank lending spreads
by half, or at least 3 percentage  points, while fixing  the Cordoba more tightly to the US Dollar,
could reduce risk premia by about 5 percentage points.  On the assumption that the average
dollar-equivalent  lending rates in Latin America remain near the current level of 20 perceit,
Nicaragua  could expect to reduce  lending rates to 12 percent with the adoption  of both reforms.
Whatever  level the dollar-equivalent  lending rates may ultimately  turn out to be, real interest
rates will exceed that level by an amount equal to the rate of real devaluation. In the absence
of further terms of  trade improvements,  real devaluations will be  needed in  response to
prospective foreign aid declines, independently  of whether a Currency Board system or US
Dollar standard is adopted.  That is, the adoption of a different monetary system would not
obviate  the need for relative  price adjustments.17
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ANNEX A
A Theoretical  Framework  for Understanding  Real Exchange  Rate Determination
Consider  a small open economy  with three aggregated  categories  of goods:
exportables,  importables  and non-traded  domestic  goods. Their nominal  prices in domestic
currency are respectively denoted P1,  P,, and Ph,. Since the external prices of both traded
goods, denoted  P,* and P.*,  are not affected  by developments  within the small home
economy,  their corresponding  internal  prices can be assumed  to equal the external  price
converted  into domestic  currency  at the prevailing  exchange  rate and adjusted  for the level of
tariffs and quantitative  restrictions. That is,
P.  =  P,*E(l  +  tm),  and  P.  =  P.*E(1 - tx),
where E represents  the nominal  exchange  rate, tm denotes  the average  level of import duties
and non-tariff  import restrictions  expressed  as an ad-valorem  tariff-equivalent  rate, and tx
denotes  the average  level of export taxes and non-tariff  export restrictions, also expressed  as
an ad-valorem  tariff-equivalent  rate.  The price of the non-traded  good, on the other hand, is
determined  by domestic  supply  and demand  conditions,  described  by the following  functional
relationship:
DIMP 1, P.,  PJIA  - Sb[P, P.,  Ph]Y =  0,  (A. 1)
where A represents  the level of domestic  absorption  and Y represents  domestic  GDP, both in
nominal  terms.  Assuming  that real demands  and supplies  are homogeneous  of degree zero
with respect to all nominal  prices, and dividing  through  by Y, Equation  A. 1 can be
expressed  as:
Dh[PI/Ph, (PIP.M)(P/Ph)](l - TS) =  Sh[Pj/Ph, (Px/P.)(P./Ph)J,  (A.2)
where TS denotes  the ratio of the trade surplus  to GDP, such that (1 - TS) represents  the
ratio of domestic  absorption  to GDP.  Equation  (A.2) expresses  an equilibrium  relationship
between  the real exchange  rate applicable  to importables,  (PI/P,), the internal terms of trade,
(P./P.), and the trade surplus  as a ratio of GDP, TS.  This relationship  can be written  in
linear-logarithmic  form as:
Ln(PI/Ph)  =  a.  +  a,Ln(P1/P.)  +  a2TS,  (A.3)
such that Ln(.) denotes  the natural  logarithm  of the attached  variable.  By subtracting  Ln(P 1,)
and adding  Ln(P 1) to both sides of Equation  (A.3), an equivalent  expression  is obtained  for
the real exchange  rate applicable  to exportables:
Ln(PI/Ph)  =  a.  +  (a, +  1)Ln(P,/P)  +  a2TS,  (A.4)
According  to this framework,  all variables  relevant  in the determination  of the
real exchange  rate are captured  by the internal  terms of trade and by the trade surplus ratio.
The internal terms of trade, (P./P),  may be considered  an exogenous  variable, since it is19
entirely determined  by the external terms of trade and trade policy  parameters set by the
government. On the other hand, the trade surplus  ratio and each of the real exchange  rates
are endogenous  variables, simultaneously  determined  by a broader set of economic
relationships. In this context,  it is useful  to regard TS as essentially  a macroeconomic
phenomenon  determined  primarily  by the public  sector deficit  and private sector savings  and
spending  behavior  that, in turn, are determined  by other variables. From this perspective,
Equations  (A.3) or (A.4) may be interpreted  as determining  the equilibrium  value of Ph.
Furthermore,  the value of the TS-coefficient,  a2, is assumed  a priQri  to be positive, based on
the following  reasoning:  an increase  in domestic  absorption  relative to income reduces  the
trade surplus  and increases  the demand for non-tradeables  as well as tradeables. This puts
pressure on Ph  to increase  (while  P. and P. remain constant  since they are determined
abroad), thus causing  both real exchange  rates, (P,/Ph)  and (P./P),  to appreciate.
Conversely,  as argued earlier in paragraph 17, a reduction  of the trade deficit motivated  by
reduced foreign  aid inflows  calls for an increase  in TS and a devaluation  of the real exchange
rates.20
ANNEX  B
Data Sources  and Defintions
The dollar-equivalent  and real interest rates presented  in this
report are based on the attached  monthly series for nominal  interest rates,
domestic  price levels and exchange  rates that were obtained  from each
country's Central Bank. For all countries, the exchange  rate refers to the
average  buy and sell rate in the banking  market for foreign  exchange  and the
domestic  price data refers to the Consumer  Price Index.  There are some
differences,  however, in the lending rates obtained  for each country: they
refer to short-term  loans  with maturities  of up to one year in the case of El
Salvador  and Nicaragua,  to new commercial  loans for "other" (non-
agricultural)  activities  in Costa Rica, and all commercial  bank loans in
Guatemala  and Honduras. Furthermore,  in the case of El Salvador,
Nicaragua  and Costa Rica (before  May 1992)  borrowing  and lending rates
refer to arithmetic  averages  of the maximum  and minimum  rates quoted  by
all banks, whereas  in the other countries  they refer to weighted  average  rates.
These differences  in financial  instruments  and aggregation  procedures  are
significant,  but not enough  to invalidate  the type of interest rate comparisons
made earlier in this report.
Calculatation  of Dollar-Equivalent and Real Interest Rates
The ex po  real and dollar-equivalent lending and borrowing
rates presented  in the report are all calculated  under the assumption  of three-
month maturities  for all loans  and deposits. This procedure  is consistent  with
the method  applied in Rodriguez  (1994)  and consists  of the following  steps:
Let i(t) denote the average  annualized  interest rate quoted  in month t, while
P(t) is the value of the Consumer  Price Index in month t and E(t) is the
average exchange  rate in month  t.  The monthly  interest rate corresponding
to this annualized  rate is then defined  as,
i'(t)  =  [Exp[Ln[l+i(t)]/12]]  - 1.
The ex ps  rates of devaluation  and of inflation  corresponding  to the
assumed  three-month  horizon  are derived  as,
eq(t)  =  [E(t+3)/E(t)]  - 1,
and
pq(t)  =  [P(t+3)/P(t)]  - 1.
Each of these quarterly average  rates of change  is then transformed  into a
monthly  average  rate as,
em(t)  =  [Exp[Ln  [1+ eq(t)]/3]] - 1,
and
pm(t)  =  [Exp[Ln[l +pq(t)]/3]] - 1.21
Using these derived  variables, the monthly  dollar-equivalent  interest rate is
defined as
d'n(t)  =  [iln(t)  - em(t)],
and the monthly  real interest rate is defined  as
rm(t)  =  [i m(t) - PM(t)]-
To finally  arrive at the figures  presented  and analyzed in the main text of the
report, these monthly  rates are transformed  into annual  rates as:
d(t)  =  [Exp[12*Ln[l+dI(t)]]]  - 1,
and
r(t)  =  [Exp[12*Ln[l+rm(t)]]] - 1.22
Deposit  Rates  Exchange  Consumer
COSTA  RICA  Lending  Rate  (I monthl  (3 monthe  Rate  Price  Index
savings  accounts
Jan-91  40.48  30.40  35.99  105.82  102.52
Feb-91  44.25  30.25  33.97  109.54  105.54
Mar-91  44.50  30.25  34.24  113.69  106.88
Apr-91  43.28  30.60  33.76  117.15  109.90
May-91  44.50  29.40  33.70  119.85  111.80
Jun-91  43.73  26.30  30.16  122.64  114.15
Jul-91  42.50  26.30  30.44  124.82  116.62
Aug-91  43.00  26.30  30.57  127.39  118.26
Sep-91  42.68  25.30  30.48  129.41  120.15
Oct-91  44.00  25.00  31.39  131.23  121.54
Nov-91  43.92  24.50  31.52  132.95  123.32
Dec-91  42.37  23.80  31.12  134.69  125.32
Jan-92  38.80  22.80  28.67  136.35  130.27
Feb-92  39.00  25.00  25.55  137.28  133.21
Mar-92  35.81  19.30  18.88  135.01  134.80
Apr-92  32.50  19.02  19.03  132.75  137.41
May-92  28.44  15.49  15.94  130.26  138.69
Jun-92  24.69  14.14  14.40  127.83  140.39
Jul-92  26.55  17.93  17.12  134.35  141.22
Aug-92  27.16  17.93  17.12  134.62  142.00
Sep-92  27.12  17.93  16.85  135.59  142.55
Oct-92  28.99  18.48  18.34  136.23  143.51
Nov-92  29.08  18.48  19.43  136.69  145.19
Dec-92  29.35  20.65  20.38  137.11  146.58
Jan-93  29.64  18.48  19.57  137.72  147.18
Feb-93  29.54  19.02  19.30  138.35  148.02
Mar-93  28.41  17.39  16.74  138.21  148.54
Apr-93  27.98  15.22  15.04  138.20  150.02
May-93  27.74  15.22  15.43  138.20  151.48
Jun-93  28.21  19.02  17.93  139.76  153.45
Jul-93  31.24  20.65  21.73  141.40  155.14
Aug-93  35.18  22.83  26.15  143.02  155.71
Sep-93  36.61  24.46  25.68  144.95  156.19
Oct-93  37.38  25.54  26.49  146.79  157.69
Nov-93  37.93  25.00  26.63  148.80  159.40
Dec-93  37.54  25.00  26.22  150.67  160.83
Jan-94  35.95  23.91  23.82  151.88  162.23
Feb-94  34.81  23.91  23.10  152.77  164.18
Mar-94  35.10  22.83  21.74  153.48  166.31
Apr-94  34.32  21.74  21.74  154.17  167.92
May-94  34.38  22.28  22.69  154.76  170.21
Jun-94  34.43  22.28  22.46  155.59  172.98
Jul-94  34.60  22.55  22.42  156.78  174.57
Aug-94  34.64  22.01  22.97  157.98  177.79
Sep-94  34.92  23.10  22.01  159.34  181.59
Source:  Central  Bank  of  Costa  Rica
Until  April 1992,  the lending  rate refers  to the average  of the maximium  and minimum
rates quote  by private  banks  for 'other activities'  on the last  Wednesday  of each
month. After  April 1992,  it refers  to the weighed  average  rate for  all such  loans.23
Deposit Rate  Exchange  Consumer
EL SALVADOR  Lending  Rate  12 month)  Ratehang  ceCondex
saving  deposits
Jan-91  22.00  14.50  8.06  793.50
Feb-91  22.00  14.50  8.06  796.10
Mar-91  22.00  14.50  8.00  807.40
Apr-91  20.00  16.00  8.00  811.60
May-91  20.00  14.13  8.00  825.60
Jun-91  20.00  14.34  8.00  832.40
Jul-91  20.00  14.20  8.01  852.40
Aug-91  20.00  14.36  8.01  853.90
Sep-91  20.00  14.17  8.03  855.60
Oct-91  20.00  14.13  8.12  856.11
Nov-91  18.00  12.75  8.14  850.67
Dec-91  18.00  12.75  8.13  855.12
Jan-92  17.92  11.71  8.13  860.15
Feb-92  16.17  11.01  8.17  862.18
Mar-92  16.00  10.89  8.20  867.96
Apr-92  16.00  10.43  8.20  877.34
May-92  15.96  10.31  8.20  880.92
Jun-92  15.96  10.38  8.24  891.50
Jul-92  15.96  10.46  8.39  908.66
Aug-92  15.96  10.48  8.44  935.02
Sep-92  16.00  10.56  8.54  978.81
Oct-92  16.03  10.96  8.65  1001.65
Nov-92  16.57  12.83  9.01  1019.95
Dec-92  17.91  15.46  8.76  1025.29
Jan-93  18.84  16.13  8.76  1047.66
Feb-93  19.45  15.51  8.80  1046.68
Mar-93  19.63  15.04  8.76  1052.83
Apr-93  20.33  15.05  8.75  1057.19
May-93  20.52  15.47  8.74  1070.31
Jun-93  19.96  16.32  8.76  1099.22
Jul-93  19.44  15.24  8.75  1122.19
Aug-93  19.22  14.30  8.72  1123.89
Sep-93  19.05  13.60  8.69  1123.67
Oct-93  18.68  13.00  8.71  1136.87
Nov-93  18.73  13.01  8.71  1138.27
Dec-93  18.79  13.04  8.74  1152.42
Jan-94  18.69  13.04  8.74  1173.38
Feb-94  18.73  13.04  8.75  1177.52
Mar-94  18.62  13.00  8.75  1186.54
Apr-94  18.74  13.00  8.75  1196.74
May-94  18.92  13.01  8.75  1196.61
Jun-94  19.00  13.18  8.75  1206.94
Jul-94  19.14  13.26  8.75  1216.46
Aug-94  19.08  13.08  8.75  1232.91
Sep-94  19.08  12.54  8.76  1231.54
Source: Central  Bank  of El Salvador24
Deposit  Rate
GUATEMALA  Lending  Rate  (1 month)  Exchange  Consumer
savings  Rate  Price Index
deposit
Jan-91  23.10  14.70  4.97  435.10
Feb-91  23.60  15.00  5.09  433.50
Mar-91  24.10  15.30  5.04  434.10
Apr-91  24.30  15.40  4.98  440.00
May-91  24.40  15.90  4.92  444.80
Jun-91  24.40  15.80  4.95  448.60
Jul-91  24.40  15.90  5.00  449.60
Aug-91  24.40  15.90  5.05  456.30
Sep-91  24.40  16.00  5.02  453.10
Oct-91  24.30  16.00  5.11  453.60
Nov-91  22.80  14.60  5.08  456.00
Dec-91  22.10  14.00  5.06  462.00
Jan-92  21.10  12.90  5.09  464.00
Feb-92  19.90  10.70  5.19  468.80
Mar-92  18.90  9.80  5.14  477.70
Apr-92  18.40  9.80  5.06  481.40
May-92  18.20  9.40  4.97  485.00
Jun-92  18.60  9.20  5.09  488.70
Jul-92  18.80  10.00  5.15  496.50
Aug-92  19.20  10.30  5.23  500.40
Sep-92  19.60  10.50  5.31  503.80
Oct-92  20.10  10.70  5.32  506.10
Nov-92  20.50  10.90  5.31  516.20
Dec-92  21.30  11.10  5.33  527.70
Jan-93  21.60  11.10  5.29  530.20
Feb-93  23.50  11.80  5.36  531.30
Mar-93  24.40  12.30  5.44  535.20
Apr-93  24.90  12.60  5.50  542.60
May-93  24.60  12.50  5.57  545.80
Jun-93  25.00  12.70  5.64  559.00
Jul-93  25.30  12.60  5.74  572.30
Aug-93  25.40  12.60  5.78  573.70
Sep-93  25.40  12.90  5.85  571.20
Oct-93  25.50  13.10  5.87  574.50
Nov-93  25.60  13.10  5.86  582.00
Dec-93  25.70  13.30  5.79  589.10
Jan-94  26.00  13.20  5.86  601.70
Feb-94  25.60  13.00  5.86  607.40
Mar-94  24.50  11.20  5.83  610.90
Apr-94  24.30  11.20  5.79  618.10
May-94  24.20  11.00  5.75  623.00
Jun-94  23.90  10.60  5.74  624.90
Ju1-94  23.00  8.80  5.66  627.80
Aug-94  21.10  7.80  5.68  635.30
Sep-94  19.60  6.70  5.80  639.60
Oct-94  19.10  6.70
Source: Central Bank of Guatemala25
Deposit  Rate  Exchange  Consume
HONDURAS  Lending  Rate  I1 month)  (3 month)  Rate  Price Index
savings  deposit
Jan-91  20.30  8.80  10.70  5.30  104.10
Feb-91  20.30  8.80  10.70  5.30  107.74
Mar-91  20.30  8.80  10.70  5.30  109.14
Apr-91  22.00  9.40  11.40  5.30  112.75
May-91  22.00  9.40  11.40  5.30  114.10
Jun-91  22.00  9.40  11.40  5.30  116.15
Jul-91  22.00  9.60  11.80  5.30  118.01
Aug-91  22.00  9.60  11.80  5.30  119.55
Sep-91  22.00  9.60  11.80  5.30  120.02
Oct-91  23.20  9.80  11.90  5.30  121.22
Nov-91  23.20  9.80  11.90  5.40  122.19
Dec-91  23.20  9.80  11.90  5.40  122.44
Jan-92  22.20  9.90  16.10  5.40  122.68
Feb-92  22.50  9.90  16.10  5.40  124.03
Mar-92  22.40  9.80  15.90  5.40  124.28
Apr-92  22.20  9.90  15.80  5.40  125.52
May-92  21.70  9.80  15.40  5.40  126.03
Jun-92  21.70  9.70  15.20  5.44  126.15
Jul-92  22.20  9.40  15.20  5.49  126.91
Aug-92  21.70  9.80  15.50  5.54  127.16
Sep-92  21.70  9.20  14.80  5.60  127.29
Oct-92  21.00  9.20  13.80  5.74  127.80
Nov-92  21.00  9.30  13.60  5.82  129.33
Dec-92  20.70  9.20  13.80  5.83  130.50
Jan-93  20.70  9.20  13.60  5.82  131.15
Feb-93  20.70  9.10  13.40  5.85  132.46
Mar-93  20.70  9.40  13.50  5.85  133.52
Apr-93  20.70  9.10  13.30  5.90  136.06
May-93  21.10  9.20  13.30  5.05  137.14
Jun-93  21.00  9.20  13.30  6.35  139.34
Jul-93  23.20  9.20  13.50  6.61  143.52
Aug-93  23.20  9.20  13.50  6.80  145.10
Sep-93  23.20  9.20  13.90  6.90  145.97
Oct-93  23.40  9.20  14.00  6.92  146.99
Nov-93  23.40  9.20  14.00  7.11  148.46
Dec-93  23.40  9.20  14.00  7.29  149.35
Jan-94  23.30  9.20  14.80  7.27  151.44
Feb-94  23.30  9.30  15.30  7.43  155.99
Mar-94  23.30  9.30  15.00  7.57  157.55
Apr-94  23.40  9.20  15.00  7.81  161.96
May-94  23.30  9.10  14.90  8.07  168.27
Jun-94  24.00  9.50  14.80  8.48  171.64
Jul-94  8.73  176.27
Aug-94  8.87  179.97
Sep-94_  9.04  181.23
Source:  Central  Bank  of Honduras  I  I26
Deposit  Rates
(Imonth)  11  month)  Officia  Consumer  US Treasury  Exchange
NICARAGUA  Lending  Rate  Cordoba  US$  Exchange  Price  Index  Bill Rate  Rate  Spread
savings  savings  Rate
accounts  accounts
Mar-91  18.00  12.00  7.00  5.00  80.81  5.91  0.05
Apr-91  18.00  15.00  7.00  5.00  97.21  5.67  0.05
May-91  18.00  12.00  7.00  5.00  90.99  5.51  0.05
Jun-91  18.00  12.00  5.88  5.00  93.92  5.60  0.05
Jul-91  18.00  12.00  5.88  5.00  94.67  5.58  0.05
AuS-91  18.00  12.00  5.88  5.00  93.20  5.39  0.05
Sep-91  18.00  12.00  5.50  5.00  94.24  5.25  0.05
Oct-91  18.00  12.00  5.31  5.00  99.24  5.03  0.04
Nov-91  18.00  12.00  5.06  5.00  100.09  4.60  0.04
Dec-91  18.00  12.00  4.50  5.00  100.00  4.12  0.05
Jan-92  18.00  12.00  4.50  5.00  101.07  3.84  0.03
Feb-92  18.00  12.00  4.50  5.00  100.37  3.84  0.03
Mar-92  16.83  13.16  5.40  5.00  100.40  4.05  0.03
Apr-92  19.49  12.67  5.07  5.00  100.95  3.81  0.03
May-92  19.44  13.18  4.95  5.00  102.44  3.66  0.04
Jun-92  19.97  12.54  4.80  5.00  101.50  3.70  0.06
Jul-92  20.22  11.63  4.79  5.00  100.62  3.28  0.07
Aug-92  19.91  11.65  4.76  5.00  100.08  3.14  0.09
Sep-92  20.34  11.30  4.98  5.00  99.92  2.97  0.09
Oct-92  20.26  11.20  4.98  5.00  101.15  2.84  0.09
Nov-92  20.23  11.30  4.98  5.00  103.06  3.14  0.09
Dec-92  20.30  11.30  5.03  5.00  103.51  3.25  0.06
Jan-93  20.00  11.59  4.99  5.72  113.11  3.06  0.04
Feb-93  20.07  11.59  5.00  6.03  121.90  2.95  0.01
Mar-93  20.22  11.67  5.03  6.05  121.59  2.97  0.01
Apr-93  20.14  11.74  5.04  6.08  121.32  2.89  0.01
May-93  20.18  11.75  5.04  6.10  122.51  2.96  0.01
Jun-93  20.24  11.69  5.07  6.13  120.79  3.10  0.01
Jul-93  20.35  12.06  5.20  6.15  122.94  3.05  0.02
Aug-93  20.35  12.02  5.32  6.18  123.20  3.05  0.04
Sep-93  20.35  12.04  5.45  6.20  123.89  2.96  0.03
Oct-93  20.10  12.23  5.49  6.23  124.02  3.04  0.02
Nov-93  20.25  12.43  5.51  6.26  123.88  3.12  0.02
Dec-93  20.25  12.38  5.51  6.32  123.65  3.08  0.02
Jan-94  20.24  12.54  5.56  6.38  125.08  3.02  0.03
Feb-94  20.20  11.28  5.56  6.44  126.04  3.21  0.02
Mar-94  20.05  11.33  5.60  6.50  126.65  3.52  0.01
Apr-94  20.00  12.21  5.66  6.56  127.04  3.74  0.01
May-94  20.50  11.07  5.65  6.62  127.82  4.21  0.02
Jun-94  20.50  11.59  5.76  6.69  130.65  4.13  0.03
Jul-94  20.45  11.11  5.76  6.75  130.57  4.26  0.05
Aug-94  20.45  11.26  5.35  6.82  132.72  4.55  0.05
Sep-94  20.04  11.53  5.78  6.88  134.88  4.68  0.04
Source: Central  Bank  of Nicaragua  I_I_I
Memo:  Since  Nicaragua's  Cordoba-denominated  interest  rates are indexed  at the Official  Exchange  Rate (OERate),
the nominal  interest  rates are calculated  as ( I + i Xl + OERate)  to conform  with  the data  definitions  used in this
report. Dollar  equivalent  rates are then derived  by deflating  with the Parallel  Market  exchange  rate, defined  as the
Official Exchange  Rate  times one  plus  the Exchange  Rate  Spread.____  _______  ______  ________  ___________  NICARAGUA
Saldos de Credito: FNI y Bancos Comerciales
Millones de Cordobas Corrientes
_________________  =____  _Mr-SI  Jun-S1  Sep-_I  Dec-S1  Mar-32  Jun-52  Sep-92  Dc-392  Mer-93  Jun-93  Se  -S3  Dec-93  Me5  9Jun.34  S_p-94
FNIITotel  _l  668.6  808.6  996  1124  1211.1  126899  1256.1  1386.1  1614.4  1631.6  1670.7  740.9  864.5  876  946.8
Credito DOrecto  649.9  764.9  914.2  1011.4  1082.6  1085  1045.4  1014.1  1120.1  1238.5  1142.2  __0  0  ____-  0  0
Credito Intermedisdo  B.7  48.6  90.8  112.8  128.6  182.9  209.7  372  494.3  493.1  636.5  740.9  864.6  876  946.8
Senco  Comeeele  _  1209.8  1316.7  1592.4  1846.1  1910.1  1376.8  1779.2  2046.9  2347.1  2656.9  2855  1  3049.6  3125  _  3363  3711.61
Credito  Dvecto  801.3  1006.1  1317.1  1690.8  1645  1134.9  1760.1  2035.2  2333.7  2639.7  2852.9  3037  2  3113.3  3351  4  3699.6
Cledrtol Inermedado  408.6  310.6  276.3  256.3  265.1  241.9  19.1  11.7  _13.4  _  17.2  13.2  12.4  11.7  11.6  11.9
Total Crd.  Prod.  1461.2  1761  2231.3  2602.2  2727.6  2220.9  2805.5  3049.3  3453.8  3778.2  3995.1  3037.2  3113.3  3351.4  3699.
Teae  de Cambio  IC$/IUSS  6.0  5.0  6.0  5.0  _  6.0  5.0  5  _  .0  ____5.0  6.1  6.1  _  6.2  __  6.3  6.5  6.7  6.9
IPC  87.8  92.5  92.91  100.0  100.4  101.5  99.0  103.5  121.6  120.8  123.9  123.7  126.7  130.7  134.9
Crhdto  Total  at Sector  N.vedo por 1  Bance  Comecal  Ion  Cordoba,  Conatentes  de D0cembre 19911
912.6k  10877  1417.8  1590.8  108361  1118.1  1777 9  1966.2  1319.3  2185.2  2302.8  24_  63  2458.2  256560  2742.6
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ANNEX C
Table C.1
COMMERCIAL BANKING SYSTEM OF NICARAGUA
Consolidated Balances as of December 31 of year indicated
(in millions of current Cordobas)
Consolidated  Public Banks  Private Banks
Commercial
Banling  System
1992 1993 1994  1992 1993 1994  1992 1993 1994
Total ASSETS  3077 4424 6325  2317 3012 3621  760 1412 2704
Reserves  518  559  873  327  245  360  192  315  512
Dep. in other banks  184  254  328  98  92  68  85  161  261
Loans  1879 2819 3750  1536 2151 2318  343  668  1432
Other Assets  496  792 1374  356  524  875  140  268  499
Total LIABILITIES  2869 4132 6016  2194 2845 3490  675 1287 2526
Loanable Funds  2496 3639 5458  1887 2465 3184  609 1175 2274
Deposits  1484 2104 3497  930 1037 1519  553 1067 1978
Credit Lines  1012 1535 1961  957 1428 1665  56  108  296
Other Liabilities  373  493  558  307  380  306  66  112  252
Net Worth  208  291  310  123  166  132  86  125 178
Source: Superintendencia de Bancos, Nicaragua,  Informe Anual,  1994
Memo item: the official exchange rate (C/US$) as of December 31 of each year is
5 in 1992, 6.3497 in  1993 and 7.1117 in 1994.29
Table C.2
COMMERCIAL  BANKING  SYSTEM  OF NICARAGUA
Consolidated  Income Statement  as of December  31 of year indicated
(in percent of total assets)
Consolidated  Public Banks  Private Banks
Commercial
l  _________________  Banking System
L__________________  1992 1993 1994  1992 1993 1994  1992 1993 1994
Total INCOME  13.4  15.1 12.8  14.7  15.4  13.2  9.4  14.5  12.1
Financial  Inc. (accr.)  8.7  10.1  8.5  9.9  11.3  9.7  5.0  7.5  6.9
Non-financial  Inc.  2.9  2.7  3.3  2.5  1.8  2.4  4.3  4.5  4.5
Portfolio Clean-up  1.7  0.0  0.0  2.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Net Gains from  0.0  2.3  1.0  0.0  2.3  1.1  0.0  2.5  0.7
Exchange Rate Adj.
Total OUTLAYS  13.0  13.4  12.6  14.4  14.1  13.8  8.9  11.9  10.9
Financial  (int.) Costs  5.8  5.5  5.5  6.8  6.3  6.7  2.5  3.9  3.8
Administrative  Costs  7.0  6.1  5.5  7.4  5.9  5.7  5.7  6.7  5.3
Loan Provision Costs  0.1  1.4  1.0  0.0  1.8  1.0  0.3  0.8  0.9
Other Expenditures  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.2  0.1  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.9
Net Earnings  0.4  1.7  0.2  0.3  1.2  -0.6  0.5  2.6  1.2
before Taxes
Source: Superintendencia  de Bancos, Nicaragua, Informe Anual, 199430
ANNEX  D
LENDING  RATES IN SOUTH  AMERICA  AND MEXICO
Country  I  Dollar-equivalent  Rate  I  Real Rate
Average Rates on local Currency  Loans in 1992 (in %)
Argentina  36.4  21.6
Bolivia  33.7  32.4
Chile  9.0  9.6
Colombia  20.2  10.6
Mexico  29.0  17.6
Peru  52.8  77.0
Uruguay  62.5  39.7
Arithmetic Average:
including Peru  34.8  29.8
excluding  Peru  31.8  21.9
Countries with Recent Adjustment Programs
(annual  average rate in the year indicated)
Argentina  (1991)  51.0  76.0
Bolivia  (1987)  46.0  46.0
Peru  (1992)  53.0  77.0
Mexico  (1988)  84.0  45.0
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